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 INTRODUCTION 
 
“We must build a kind of United States of Europe. In this way only will 
hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which 
make life worth living. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and 
truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less 
important. Small nations will count as much as large ones and gain their honor by 
their contribution to the common cause.” 
Winston Churchill, 1946 
 
Britain’s wartime leader, Winston Churchill led the way calling for 
European States to come together to heal the wounds of war and prevent future 
conflicts. He believed that the United Europe would also reinforce the principles of 
liberty and democracy among its members.  
Today, the continent is at the beginning of its 70-year cycle of peace. But the 
real problem is political one. Every opinion poll shows growing discontent in most 
European nations. Many people are not happy with the way Europe is run. Far 
right and nationalist parties from the National Front in France to the Hungarian 
Jobbik party are getting more and more support across the continent. Being a 
symbol of the future, Europe is now on the verge of a deep structural crisis. 
Although it was the British Conservative Prime minister who provided the 
basis for the modern European Union, the UK has consistently represented a 
difficult issue in European integration. There has long been a debate in British 
political and public life on pros and cons of staying with Europe. Quite ironically, 
almost 25 years after the European dream has come true with the ratification of the 
Maastricht treaty, it is the British Conservative prime minister, David Cameron 
who has given up that dream with a historic vote to leave the European Union. 
The 2016 Brexit referendum is very likely going to be talked about by 
historians in future, because it means the end of Britain in Europe. It can possibly 
be the first step to the end of Europe as well.  
 The urgency of the research: An analysis of Brexit is very important to 
improve our understanding of the event and also to perceive upcoming democratic 
events better. It is important to realize that voting on issues depends not only on 
realities but perceptions and emotions created by opinion makers.  
In Britain, most of the dominant voices on Europe, including the 
Conservative Party, blame the existence of the Union, its currency and institutions 
for the problems the British people face. They never relate to Europe as the 
solution, seeing it only as a problem. In spite of the fact that there are some real 
issues with the EU, over half of the British subjects as we know from the 
referendum results, don’t like Europe. Eventually, rightly or wrongly but 
perception is everything in politics which Brexit referendum is all about. There are 
some real forces and actors that took the country out of Europe.  
The object of the research is the language of speeches of the British Prime 
Ministers and Mass Media comments about them. 
The research topic is linguistic means and features of Brexit as a political 
phenomenon. 
The current study aims to identify these major perceptions that are of great 
importance for understanding how the UK came to the Brexit vote and why it 
actually happened.  
The research tasks are: 
1. To study theoretical basis of the research from political and linguistic 
points. 
2. To define the notion “Brexit”. 
3. To find out main political issues of Brexit situation in Britain.  
4. On this background to analyze the linguistic aspects of political texts: 
speeches of the Prime Ministers and Mass Media comments on their 
political activity. 
Theoretically, the scientific research paper is based on the researches of the 
primary sources (EU Treaties, Conservative Party manifestos, speeches and 
debates) and the researches of the topic in the works of N.J. Crowson, D. 
 MacShane,  M. Emerson, A. Forster,  S. George D. Gowland, A. Turner, A. 
Wright, C. Layne, N. Ludlow and others. 
The data of the research are the speeches, debates and Mass Media 
comments on Brexit situation. 
The methods of the research are: descriptive method – to describe the 
Brexit situation and the its linguistic aspects; linguistic interpretation method – to 
interpret the linguistic means and features in speeches, debates and Mass Media 
comments; contextual analysis method – to describe the meaning and significance 
of linguistic means in their contexts.  
The work consists of three chapters. The first chapter deals with the post 
war period when the European countries, mainly France and Germany triggered 
the process of globalization and further integration which spread out across the 
whole globe. That is why we think that Brexit has profound historical significance, 
not only for England and the European Union, but for the Eastern countries, Asia, 
Africa, USA, and indeed for the whole world. It marks a drastic reversal of the 
process of internationalism which had been going on for quite some time after the 
Second World War. All these changes haven’t happened overnight. In the first 
chapter we have decided to analyze a wider time span, from the very beginning of 
integration. Because the understanding of why Britain has decided to enter the 
European Economic Community (EEC) will make Brexit referendum issue more 
clear for us. 
The second chapter analyzes the transformation of British policy towards the 
European Union and explains the Brexit referendum itself. It was the British 
Conservative Party that led the country into the EEC. Later the position of 
subsequent governments in relation to the integration processes, in particular, their 
deepening, changed significantly to the extent that since the end of the twentieth 
century, the Tories have undoubtedly helped to transform the UK into a more 
eurosceptic nation. As a result, nowadays the main hostility to the EU in British 
politics comes from the right-wing. In this regard, it is important to understand at 
which stage it has happened, what has caused the change in the position of the 
 British ruling elite on this issue and, more generally, if  the rejection has been 
shared by the UK population.  
In a separate subchapter the attention is paid to the Brexit plebiscite in the 
context of David Cameron's conservatism. Despite of the fact that the preservation 
of national sovereignty within the EU and the resistance to further integration are 
on the list of priorities of the Tories, it was the first time when the Conservative 
leader decided to hold the referendum. The question is what prompted David 
Cameron to make such a decision. It seems that the answer lies not only in 
relations with European partners, so we need to look at the reasons: why it turns 
out that Cameron has finished up on the losing side and has become the prime 
minister who took Britain out of Europe. 
Another issue that is covered in this chapter is the referendum campaign. 
The most careful attention is paid to the key players in the campaign on both sides. 
We shall try to explain how the Leave campaign won – and how the Remain camp 
lost this historic vote. An analysis of different factors (political, sovereignty, 
immigration, much of the press, identity) is shown. 
The 2016 referendum results on the UK’s membership in the EU surprised 
not only the citizens within the country but the entire world. For the first time in 
the union's history, a member state had decided to leave. The UK is now entering 
uncharted territories and it is too early to say whether Brexit is good or bad. That is 
why in the third chapter we decided to describe the process of Britain’s withdrawal 
from the EU and give some hypothesis about the possible outcome. For instance, 
we will look at possible alternative scenarios for the UK’s future relationships with 
Europe. The economy’s prospects after the referendum are given as well. Another 
thing to take in mind about Brexit is the regional breakdown vote which calls into 
question the integrity of the United Kingdom as we know it. The chapter also 
describes the country’s future influence in the world. 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER I. “Brentrance”: A Tricky Road from Churchill to 
Heath: theoretical basis of the research 
 
1.1. Great Britain and Europe: the first steps towards the 
integration 
 
The European Union (EU) today unites and coordinates the interests of 
twenty-eight states of Western, Eastern and Central Europe, the Baltic and the 
Mediterranean. An inalienable right and the main duty of each full member is to 
participate actively and constructively in the definition and implementation of 
goals, objectives and priorities in the field of internal and foreign policy of the 
Union. In other words, each separate national state, both in theory and in practice, 
depending on a number of objective and subjective factors, has the ability to 
influence the course and outcome of the collegial decision-making process. 
Obviously, questions about the degree of interest, responsibility and involvement 
of individual Member States in the process of political decision-making are 
fundamental and strategically important for the present and future of the European 
Union. In this context, taking into account the objective realities and challenges of 
the present time, namely related to the British exit from the European Union, the 
problem of scientific study of the historical experience of country’s integration 
seems to be extremely urgent.  
We are convinced that the historical experience of the careful integration of 
the United Kingdom into the structures of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and later to the EU can’t simply be explained in a form of a classification of 
states on convinced Eurosceptics or, on the contrary, Euro-enthusiasts. The thing is 
that it is very superficial and conditional, and only in rare cases is able to reflect 
objectively the complex picture of reality. Thus, Brexit is usually regarded as the 
victory of British Euroscepticism, namely for pragmatism, the desire to preserve 
national identity, consistent and well-grounded criticism of integration processes 
and "federalization" of the European Union. In this case, the term Euroscepticism 
 in relation to the British realities usually has quite negative meaning. Presumably, 
such a superficial perception eliminates the opportunity to understand the profound 
nature of the problem and conflict of interest that resulted in Brexit.  
To be a part of Europe and to remain British – this is how we can explain the 
UK foreign policy during the second half of the 40s and the mid-90s of the XXth 
century. The history of the intercultural dialogue between Great Britain and Europe 
in the past century has always been very difficult. Actually, the beginning of the 
dialogue as such not with Europe in the abstract sense, but with the new type of 
integration, started at the end of the 40s, right after the WWII. And, strictly 
speaking, it was not a real dialogue, but the first cautious attempts to establish the 
necessary strategic contacts with those partners that during this period attempted to 
start the European integration, primarily with France and Germany.  
Needless to say that the situation in which Europe turned out to be after the 
WWII contributed to the fact that the issues of peaceful existence on the continent 
were now closely related with the issues of development, cooperation and 
solidarity. Hunger, lack of jobs, migration, forced the governments of the European 
states to sign more agreements on cooperation in various fields. In other words, the 
WWII was the turning point in the complex history of bilateral relations between 
the European countries. 
  “It was the war itself which was the catalyst for a new surge of interest in 
European Unity, leading to negative assessments of the prewar political situation 
and economic practices”  [Urwin 1999 : 45]. As a result, the UK has really become 
closer to Europe. In spite of the fact that in the first postwar years the source of 
Eurosceptic sentiments was not exhausted, it did not have a decisive influence on 
Britain's choice in favour of Europe and further integration.  
Winston Churchill’s 1946 Zurich speech can be considered as a starting 
point for further development on the European continent. Beginning with the 
words about the tragedy of Europe, Churchill gradually proceeded to the ideas 
proposed by the French thinker and statesman A. Brian about the creation of the 
United States of Europe. As a representative of the third party, Churchill stressed 
 the need for partnership between France and Germany, thereby openly recognizing 
the role of France as a key factor of pan-European development: “The first step in 
the re-creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and 
Germany.” 
Moreover, Churchill underlined that the creation of the United States of 
Europe can’t no longer be delayed. The British position, according to his speech, 
was to promote the European cooperation in every possible way, but at the same 
time to remain aloof.  
Quite interestingly, but Churchill’s statement that: “We are with Europe, but 
not of it” was advanced and widely used by Eurosceptics through the Brexit 
campaign. Actually, such a usage of Churchill’s name for political posturing has 
nothing to do with his actual views on Europe. Boris Johnson and UKIP leader 
Nigel Farage attempts to prove that Churchill has never been really all that pro-
European, can’t be valid. The thing is that they quoted skillfully and selectively 
from his post-war speeches that generally supported the idea of a “United States of 
Europe”. In spite of the Churchill’s view that the British role in the European 
unification shouldn’t be the same as French or German, he has to be listed as one 
of the greatest pro-Europeans in British political life.  
The main reason why Churchill didn’t see Britain fully involved in the 
process of European integration is that it demanded reconciliation with its two 
other “special relationships”: the British Commonwealth and the wider English-
speaking world, namely the USA. The British wartime leader realized that his big 
vision of Britain's role in the world wholly depended on the realities of power. “It 
could only work if the Commonwealth was a powerful political unit and if Britain 
could exercise significant influence over both Europe and the United States” 
[Heath 1996 : http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/a-euro-sceptic-churchill-
never-1365239.html]. Moreover, Churchill believed that Britain should not give 
preference to any partner, in other words all the three of them were of equally 
important to the country.  
 While being cautious, Churchill had an idealistic vision of the new world. 
But there was a real politics as well. All of postwar parties had moments of doubt 
about different aspects of the European integration, in particular the British Labour 
leaders. The thing is that they had their own interest in turning Britain into a more 
egalitarian and more democratic country. Taking into account the fact that they 
only could achieve it due to the absolute legitimacy of political process within the 
country (majority of seats in the House of Commons meant that the government 
had a free hand), sovereignty was therefore seen as of the paramount importance.  
Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, said in 1950: “We are determined 
not to put those gains in peril through allowing vital decisions on great issues of 
national economic policy to be transferred from the British Parliament at 
Westminster to some supra national European Assembly” [Jenkins 1983 : 23]. 
This is the explanation of the left wing party’s hostility to the European 
integration. “In 1950, Labour thus laid down the foundations for saying No to 
Europe at the highest level of the party and government” [MacSchane 2016 : 272]. 
It is worth noting that this attitude was maintained more or less till the Brexit 
campaign, when all the “classic” British arguments on sovereignty and rejection of 
accepted practices came to the surface.  
In the mid-50's Britain had a chance to enlist the support of France and to 
reinforce rapprochement with Europe. Relations between the two states developed 
very intensely. It is of interest that on September 10, 1956, Guy Mollet, during his 
personal meeting with Anthony Eden, suggested to create a union state or at least 
to accept France into the British Commonwealth, with the aim of securing support 
in the Middle East. However, E. Eden did not react to these little curious 
initiatives. Soon the Suez crisis broke out, Britain and France found themselves on 
opposite sides of the barricades. For almost half a century Britain and France had 
been coordinated their international activities and they grew apart nowadays. The 
UK didn’t have enough resources to hold its own "big game" and it was necessary 
to stay as close as possible to the center where decisions were made – the United 
States and, if possible, influence this process.  
 In the late 1950s the history of relations came to the uncertainty, which is 
very likely due to the growing role of France and the supranational character of the 
debate that has begun on the future of the United Europe. “Instead, when the EEC 
was born the following year, France teamed up with Germany while Britain 
watched on. The rest, it seems, is history” [BBC News 2007 : 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6261885.stm].  
It seems that over time, the previous enthusiasm for the UK to contribute to 
the unity of the continent has somewhat weakened. We can identify several factors 
that played a big role – in the fact throughout the 1950s the country was never able 
to stand at the origins of European integration, and was practically excluded from 
the unified Europe: 
 First of all, a different understanding of further development. Britain 
favoured the strengthening of its position in the world. Realizing that 
it will not be possible to overtake the world leaders, the political elite 
didn’t want to give up. Concentration on Europe would mean the loss 
of the relationships with the Commonwealth. 
 Secondly, Britain did not support the idea of creating supranational 
structures, insisting that problems must be solved at the interstate 
level. 
 Thirdly, different economic interests. While the industrial sector was 
crucial for the recovering economies of continental Europe, for 
Britain, the status of London as one of the world's currency centers 
was much more important. 
This isolation from the general context in practice resulted in the creation of 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In fact, it was an alternative version 
of integration. Seven states that had not found their place in the overall structure of 
the EEC decided to take part in EFTA, they were: Great Britain, Denmark, Austria, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.   
Generally speaking, the consequences of the Suez crisis for the subsequent 
world development turned out to be very significant. First of all, it accelerated the 
 disintegration of the old colonial empires. Under the pressure of the public opinion, 
A. Iden was forced to resign; the new Prime Minister Harold Macmillan gave his 
famous speech to the Parliament of South Africa, saying that: “The wind of change 
is blowing through this continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of national 
consciousness is a political fact.”  
In the late 1950s – early 60s almost all British colonies became independent. 
All the contradictory factors, including idealism that dominated government 
thinking from 1945 to 1955 now receded into the background. Churchill’s 
romantic vision of world order in the early post-war years now was far from the 
reality. Decolonization, while laudable, had robbed the Commonwealth of its 
political cohesion; and the United States and the EEC, blessed with rapid economic 
growth and confident and outward-looking political leadership, were both now far 
less susceptible to British influence. The country’s policy changed rapidly under 
all these circumstances. As a result, Britain could only continue playing the role in 
the world that Churchill had envisaged by joining the Common Market. 
 
1.2. H. Macmillan’s government and the problem of accession to 
the EEC 
 
By the early 1960s, the unstable post-war period had finished and Britain 
started to reconsider its “wait and see” policy. If previously it was possible to stay 
aloof and observe the strengthening of Franco-German relations, now such a 
behavior was not in favour of the country's economic position. “The ruling circles 
of Britain began to realize that the role of the global power they took did not 
correspond to the actual economic and military potential of the state” [Sorokina 
2014 : https://is.muni.cz/th/404812/fss_m/Master_Thesis.pdf]. 
However, public opinion in the country and within the major political parties 
turned out to be ambiguous. Some British worried that, joining the ranks of the 
EEC, the UK could weaken its ties with the Commonwealth and the member states 
of the Free Trade Association. The perception of Britain in the countries of 
 continental Europe was also skeptical. With the arrival of Charles de Gaulle, the 
attitude of the French political elite towards Britain’s desire to become an active 
player in Europe has become more negative. 
In 1961 Britain made its first application to join the Common Market. This 
application received a majority in the Parliament and 313 votes were given in 
support of the application. However, Labour and some anti-European Conservative 
MP’s were not in favour of British accession to the EEC. Labour even opposed the 
bid in a Commons vote that was defeated. 
Harrold Macmillan had some solid arguments that would have positively 
influenced the British economy, but the truth is tat the “Common Market” has 
divided both parties. Some anti-European Conservatives remained suspicious, not 
to mention the Labour party activists who already defined a sovereignist ideology 
within its members. In his domestic political tactics Macmillan had to maneuver. 
This is explained by the fact that he could not completely ignore the opinion of any 
of these groups. Therefore, Macmillan had to take into account the interests of all 
the parties. That’s the reason why he decided to follow an old Winston Churchill’s 
approach "we are with Europe, but not of it" and applied for EEC membership on 
certain conditions, that would suit Britain better. By and large, the entry into the 
EEC was presented by Macmillan as a profitable business deal. 
EEC, according to the prime minister, was an investment-attractive 
association for third countries, and its goods are more competitive outside Europe. 
Participation of the UK, in addition, would be a big contribution to the 
consolidation of Europe.  
The British Prime Minister also had to explain to his colleagues that even 
agriculture issues should not be the reason for the UK's refusal to participate in the 
EEC. Taking into account the distrust of many parliamentarians, understanding of 
the fact that closer cooperation with the Six is inevitable was certainly a big change 
in British politics.  
Successful economic development of the EEC reflected in the formulation of 
British policy guidelines. It was already clear that EFTA did not justify the hopes 
 of the UK and certainly could not become a worthy competitor to the rapidly 
developing European economic structures. The six countries were becoming more 
successful due to the 178 million people market. The trading commercial ties 
between Britain and the Six expanded more rapidly than with the former colonies. 
To make it worse, Britain also knew that the country could no longer play the go 
between the USSR and US, not to mention the fact that there were increasing ties 
between the US and the European countries. The creation of the European 
Organization for Nuclear Research with the participation of British physicists was 
a shining example of collaboration. That’s why more and more English people 
within the world of business supported the EEC. 
Negotiations between the representatives of the United Kingdom and the Six 
were very difficult. H. Macmillan had to act actively to persuade all opposition 
members not only at home, but also abroad. Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands were ready to discuss the conditions under which the United 
Kingdom would join the EEC, but the French representatives said their word. The 
French leader, General de Gaulle, gathered a special conference on January 14, 
1963. As expected, the position he voiced was sharply negative. The criticism by 
de Gaulle of the "special relationship" with the United States and the global 
ambitions of London certainly had its influence. Gaulle’s “Veto” led to the fact 
that the negotiations with Britain were suspended.  
In spite of the fact that the Macmillan government acted very prudently, the 
first British application for membership of the EEC turned out to be rejected. The 
"Trojan horse" was left behind the progressive association of European countries. 
Nevertheless, this attempt to join the EEC was more than a simple bid. We think 
that for the first time since the 1945, British people realized that they could no 
longer be isolated, while in continental Europe this understanding came 
immediately after the war. In addition to that, this attempt helped to mobilize all 
pro-European forces within the country. Many British were convinced now that the 
country should join the EEC. 
 During this period of time, the Labour inconsistency reappeared with the 
arrival of Harrold Wilson who had joined the party’s anti-Europeanist line. 
“However, once Wilson became prime minister in 1964 Labour’s weather-vane 
turned once again and Britain applied to join the EEC” [MacSchane 2016 : 272].  
The state of the UK economy throughout the 60s did not cause envy of its 
European neighbors. Mainly, because of the fact, that the economic cooperation 
within the FTA was moving much slower than the EEC. The Six had become the 
real center of gravity – the economic center. Some close British partners, like 
South Africa had seen exports to EEC go up to 17% in 1957 – 1961. The 
government knew that the UK national income had risen twice as slowly in Britain 
over the same period.  
By the end of the 60s, the current situation made Britain reconsider its 
position both in Europe and the world. The question on whether the UK should 
continue to strengthen the EFTA or to join the EEC was top of the agenda not only 
for Britain, but for many other EFTA members.  
The opposition to the filing of a new application for membership in the EEC 
was quite strong among both the Conservatives and the Labour Parties. They 
remembered well in what way the first attempt ended. The situation in which the 
Prime Minister Wilson and his team found themselves was rather complicated. 
They had to convince the British officialdom, including their own party members, 
that joining the EEC is an unavoidable measure for the country's further 
sustainable development.  
Great Britain, when applying for the second application for membership of 
the EEC member countries, was only interested in economic development, which 
could be stimulated by membership in the organization. However, it also did not 
reach success. In 1967 its attempt to enter to the Common Market again failed with 
the rejection of General de Gaulle. 
The British Opposition headed by E. Heath spoke for the country’s accession 
to the EEC. The new leader of the Conservative party came to power with an 
intention to raise British economy to a new level by making a big reform of 
 industrial relations and domestic industry to fierce competition within the EEC. 
“Unlike all his postwar predecessors and successors as well as the British public at 
large, he took the view that the EEC was a dynamic and unfinished creation that 
might in the course of time evolve into a federation” [Gowland 2009 : 72]. 
E. Heath was undoubtedly the most pro-European of any British Prime 
Minister since 1945 and his arrival spun the Opposition’s well. Only six years ago, 
the Labour Party being in government had sought to join Europe. In opposition, the 
party refused this line. Moreover, Heath also had anti-European Conservative MPs 
who did not want to support him. “They repeatedly made the point that Britain 
would lose a degree of absolute independence and political sovereignty by signing 
the Treaty of Rome and accepting, among other political changes, the authority of 
the European Court of Justice over Britain” [MacSchane 2016 : 49]. 
On October 28, 1972 the House of Commons decided on the country's 
accession to the European Economic Community. The decision was not easy given 
the lack of a clear position on this issue. Both in Labour and Conservatives were 
those who voted in favour, and those who for various reasons considered the entry 
of the state into the EEC somehow unnecessary. So, among the 356 people who 
voted for the entry, there were 69 Labour MPs, while among the 244 opponents of 
the UK membership in European integration were 39 conservatives.  
All this, along with demonstrations of citizens in support of Britain's 
accession to the EEC and growing social discontent, shows the lack of a clear 
understanding in the country about what the UK membership in the European 
structures exactly means.  
It is significant that throughout the Brexit campaign one of the arguments 
used by Eurosceptics was that people had supported EEC entry in the early 1970’s 
only as an economic project without any form of political implications. Of course, 
it has nothing to do with the reality taking into account all the Conservative MPs 
who voted against the Common Market with the main argument about the possible 
political consequences.  
 The Prime Minister E. Heath, who finally took Britain into Europe told 
voters that the EEC was merely a free trade association. But the truth is that  “he 
knew that the original members of the EEC had a long-standing commitment to 
political union and the step by step creation of a European superstate” [Coleman 
2011 : http://www.vernoncoleman.com/euillegally.html]  
Nevertheless, an important step was taken. In January 1972, British 
representatives signed an agreement on accession, and in July a Parliament’s lower 
house supported the accession. In October this decision found support in the House 
of Lords and from January 1, 1973 the UK became a new member of the EEC. 
The first, most important and most crucial stage in the history of the new 
partnership formation between Britain and Europe has been successfully 
completed. As expected, it turned out to be very difficult. In fact, it took eleven 
years for Britain to become a full member of the EEC.  
 
1.3. The UK governmental policy in the EEC 
 
With the UK accession to the EEC a new stage in the country’s history 
began. Approximately at the same time, a discussion about the new status of 
Britain in Europe started. Apparently, the first step in this direction was the very 
mixed reaction of the British society to the question of whether the country should 
take part in the processes of the European integration not only of its own interests, 
but of the whole Europe. The reaction was quite predictable – the society was 
divided into yes and no camps. Of course, Britain failed to create even a semblance 
of unity on this issue. The minimal preponderance of participation in European 
affairs within the framework of the EEC was achieved with great efforts. The same 
reaction was observed in the Parliament, where political forces could come to a 
compromise only after long and fierce debates. The 1970s became a real test of 
strength both for Britain and all European structures.  
In 1974, after the next parliamentary elections the Labour party was back in 
government. The result of the elections was a source of doubts and uncertainty 
 about the policy of the new government, both within the country and in the EEC. 
Taking into account the results of the vote in the House of Commons, the 
expectations were not the most positive.  
Right after the Labour came to power, the government held a referendum in 
1975 and asked the public whether Britain should remain in the EEC. It was more 
Yes or No vote than “Leave” and “Remain” referendum, promised by David 
Cameron in 2016.  
The government official position was in favour of Britain remaining in 
Europe. So did the Opposition, with the new leader of the Conservative party – 
Margaret Thatcher. “A survey of 419 company chairmen produced 415 saying Yes 
to staying in Europe. The national trade union leadership was in favour” 
[MacSchane 2016 : 52]. 
Meanwhile the Labour was divided over Europe. Many of the party 
members remained opposed. Just like in 2016, when David Cameron confirmed 
that ministers are free to campaign for 'Brexit', the suspending of cabinet 
responsibility allowed government ministers to take either side of the referendum 
on Britain’s membership of the EU. However, in contrast to today, most of the 
medias were on the Yes side, with only some local newspapers aligning themselves 
with the opposition. Another interesting contradiction with the Brexit campaign is 
that in 1975 Tories and British business did a great job in order to unite with 
Europe. 
The referendum resulted in 67% vote in favour of staying in Europe. 
“According to Gallup polls, the decisive issues for the electorate in favour of our 
staying put were: defence, Britain's voice in international affairs; Britain's position 
in the world; and hopes for the future of "our children” [Keegan 2014 : 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/may/18/in-out-referendum-eu-1975-
allover-again]. 
So, the country has strongly voted to stay with Europe. The fact that this 
initiative was supported and the referendum was held speaks of a difficult process 
of adaptation to the EEC and correction of the course. However, the country's 
 accession to the European integration did not mean an immediate and cardinal 
revision of both domestic and foreign policies and attitudes towards Europe. In a 
word, the debates were not over. All the old habits to separate Britain from 
continental Europe have not disappeared. Right after the accession, the British 
government had a point of disagreement with its European counterparts on a 
number of important issues including energy policy and agriculture. The situation 
in the world was not stable either: global economic and energy crisis, collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system. In addition to that there was a lot of problems within 
the country: strikes and power cuts continued, oil prices caused double-digit 
inflation. Many fears were caused by the depreciation of the pound only a few 
weeks after the British application was reviewed and accepted. All these factors 
could not but strengthened the criticism about Britain joining the EEC.  
There are many examples when the British government is trying to abandon 
the common European course. Thus, in the mid-1970s, the British government 
took a sharp stance on energy policy. A huge jump in oil prices in 1973-74 caused 
fierce discussions within the integration association. There were proposals on the 
formation of a unified energy course on the territory of member-states. This idea 
was strongly rejected by the British politicians. Of course, the political elite agreed 
on the necessity of making a unified response to the actions of oil-exporting 
countries. But to store the British oil reserves outside of the country was absolutely 
unacceptable. Moreover, in 1975 the government insisted that on the energy 
conference in Paris Britain should represent its interests as a separate state, not as 
member of the EEC.  
Over the years of participation in the EU, the UK has developed a very 
pragmatic and even a consumer approach to the integration. This approach was 
also prevalent in the 60s, when there was an urgent need to join the EEC in order 
not to stay behind the economic development. The main problem is that this 
pragmatic approach wasn’t revised with the country's entry into the structure of the 
EEC. With the support of the European idea, the importance of peace in Europe, 
Britain, however, tends to accept European structures as a mechanism that can lead 
 to some benefits, primarily in the economic sphere. As a result, the country 
reserves the right to participate in “good projects” which are beneficial or 
promising, and to reject those that seem to be “bad”.  
So, for example, in 1973 the UK together with Ireland and Italy refused to 
participate in the "currency snake". This was one of the first currency regulation 
initiatives; the main goal was to reduce discrepancy between the rates of the 
national currencies of the EEC countries to 2.5%. This event was of great 
importance for both sides of the dialogue. By and large, the community was 
interested in progressive development of economic integration, the key element of 
which at that time was the "European currency snake". But Britain found it 
unacceptable and left the tunnel in June of the same year.  
Yet this decision of the British government could not be immediately 
perceived as a rejection of integration. Though, there were fundamental issues, or 
the "conflict of interests". The core of the problem lies in the fact that the UK’s 
accession to the EEC had a forced nature, at this time it was the only one way to 
save its influence in the world. The thing is that Britain continued to be its relations 
with the Commonwealth and traditionally with the United States. Thus, the 
continental Europe was not a priority, but one of the directions. 
After analyzing the situation and weighing all the pros and cons, the British 
government develops and adopts an unofficial economic strategy, which hasn’t 
changed a bit till Brexit. To put it simply, the country takes into account all the 
recommendations from Brussels, but does not seek to implement them 
immediately, waiting at first how it will affect the situation in other member states 
of the EEC (EU).  However, the result in the majority of cases was pretty much the 
same: in the end Britain had to accept what was previously agreed on between 
other EEC member states.  
Joining the EEC was a great idea, but the problem is that Britain did it too 
late and as a result missed its chance to play a bigger role. The attempt to crate 
EFTA did not justify British hopes and failed to become a force in Europe opposed 
to the rapidly developing Common Market. 
 In 1975, Edward Heath wrote an article for The Guardian with the title: 
"Britain has never been able to opt out of Europe, and this has never been truer" in 
which he explained that Britain will never be able to stay away from those events 
that occur within the continent [Heath 1975 : 
http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/11/27/3f2cb84e-0f87-4545-af46-
e07b147c3911/publishable_en.pdf]. All these political slogans that Britain should 
have played a major role in the EU’s evolution were also used in further decades, 
but almost always remained unfulfilled in practice. By and large, after the 
accession to the EEC, Britain has returned to the wait-and-see policy. 
To this should be added internal factors: skeptical moods of the population 
and the press, political parties separated by their attitude to European processes did 
not contribute to convergence with a unified Europe. Consideration by the 
country's leadership of such group interests led to the usage of nationalist rhetoric 
and militant defense of national interests. This course was pursued by the 
subsequent governments of the postwar period i.e. the obstructionist policy 
towards Europe.  
The end of the decade coincided with the beginning of a turning point in the 
history relations between Britain and Europe. In 1979, after the general elections 
Conservatives with its new leader, Margaret Thatcher was back in power. Since 
that time and more than for eighteen years, the country’s foreign policy with 
Europe has been influenced by institutional Euroscepticism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER II. The transformation of British policy towards the 
European Union: linguistic aspects of the political phenomenon 
“Brexit” 
 
2.1. From M. Thatcher to J. Major: linguistic means of famous 
Prime Ministers’ speeches, debates and Mass Media comments 
 
In this Chapter we shall examine the situation under study from two points 
of view. First of all, we are interested in the political events, which can prove the 
changes in British policy in connection with the European Union. But then we 
shall verify the main issue with the linguistic facts. Linguistic contexts will be 
studied in two aspects. We think it is rather important to compare the language of 
the political leaders who give comments on the topic themselves and mass media 
feedback on the events.   
The Conservative Party of Great Britain is the oldest political party in the 
world, with enormous political influence. Its representatives ruled the country for 
most of the XIX and XX centuries. The period from 1979 to 1997 takes special 
place in the history of the party. At this time, due to the record time span of 
Margaret Thatcher and John Major’s service as Prime ministers, when the 
established tradition of alternating Labor and Conservatives in the government was 
broken. Such a long stay of the Conservative Party in power contributed to major 
shift both in foreign and domestic policy that later contributed to the growth of 
Brexit tendencies. 
In the mid-1970s, Britain turned out to be in the grip of political, socio-
economic, and moral crisis. Margaret Thatcher's coming to power at the end of the 
decade demonstrated how much her political views were in demand around 
Britain. Since that time and for more than eighteen years, the country’s foreign 
policy with Europe was influenced by the institutional Euroscepticism.  
«We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, 
only to see them re-imposed at a European level, with a European super-state 
 exercising a new dominance from Brussels».1 This quotation is taken from 
Margaret Thatcher’s famous speech to the College of Europe at Bruges in 
September 1988. Later this speech was known as «The Bruges Speech». The usage 
of two confronting verbs in this passage is interesting. Mrs. Thatcher used them as 
antonymous: roll back – re-impose. The meaning of the first one is: to return 
something to someone by rotating it, as with a wheel or a ball (direct meaning) and 
to return something to a previous condition (metaphorical meaning). The meaning 
of the second verb: to establish previously imposed laws, controls, etc, again. 
Semantically it was important for Mrs. Thatcher to show the coming back to the 
initial order of things.  
The “iron lady” known for her directness of judgments openly expressed her 
attitude towards the European project. She called for the renewal of relations with 
the EU, which would allow her to give up the uniform principles of social, 
economic and agricultural policies. Thatcher did not call for a complete exit from 
the European Community, however, she insisted on the necessity of a different 
form of relationships. It was a tactics that allowed in combination with a selective 
participation in the integration processes, promoting British own interests to 
regulate the schedule of movement of the EEC in the right direction for the UK 
[Sorokina 2014 : 25]. It is not accidental that the plan for the withdrawal of the 
country from long-standing stagnation began to be implemented immediately. Step 
by step, the country's economy began to recover, demonstrating to the world the 
growing role of Britain in the field of international finance and politics.  For 
instance, persistence and political will of M. Thatcher restored the British military 
presence in the Persian Gulf, where actions against Argentina in the Falkland 
Islands resulted in an unconditional British victory, which not only strengthened 
London's position on the world stage, but also raised the national consciousness of 
the British people.  
In the preface to Conservative General Election Manifesto (1987), Thatcher 
argued that in the last decades the situation in the UK had radically changed for the 
better: “We have risen to fresh challenges at home and abroad!” In this very short 
 quotation we can feel the optimism of Margarethe Thatcher political views. The 
exclamatory mark at the end of the sentence proves it to us. From the point of 
vocabulary we can stress that the verb “rise” is used in Present Perfect form – to 
show that the country has already achieved much success in the political arena. 
The expression “fresh challenges” proves that a new stage is going to start and it 
will be a great one in comparison with the previous one.   
The success of Thatcher's course resulted in the support and voice of the 
electorate, while her position as the leader of the Conservative Party was much 
criticized by many politicians not only abroad, but also within the county. 
M. Thatcher and her government objectively criticized many aspects of 
European integration and were extremely unhappy with its main direction.  The 
Mass Media illustrate this fact with using a lot of stylistically coloured words: 
“Thatcher’s uncompromising and often provocative rhetoric regarding European 
integration” [Bismarck 2016 : http://ukandeu.ac.uk/margaret-thatcher-the-critical-
architect-of-european-integration/]. The choice of the lexemes shows that the 
author of the article wants to stress the real nature of Mrs. Thatcher political 
platform towards the integration with Europe. 
In the early 1980s it was already clear that the Community was transforming 
into the integration association with attributes of a super-state. In Britain, this 
process took a hostile welcome. All aspects of integration which conservatives 
began to perceive as an obstacle and a contradiction to the country’s national 
interests were subjected to a strict criticism.  
Especially, M. Thatcher and her supporters were against the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the size of Britain's contribution into the budget of 
the EC. Margaret Thatcher believed that agricultural policy was ineffective and the 
CAP was unprofitable for British agriculture, moreover she stated that it was 
“inefficient and grossly expensive” [Minford 2005 : 16]. The question of cutting 
the public expenses in the country was a matter of principle for Thatcher. The main 
reason for this was the fact that a great share of the European budget had been 
spent on the CAP and since farming did not represent the major sector in the UK 
 economy, Britain felt that it benefited much less than other countries.  In 1980 this 
difference was about 1.2 billion pounds sterling. Great Britain made a contribution 
of 20% from the total Community budget, but it got from it in the form of various 
payments only about 10%. 
She suggested a practical solution of the problems through the democratic 
process of discussion. In 1984, Margaret Thatcher’s government negotiated a 
reduction of the British contribution, and the country was paid one billion ECU 
(European Currency Unit) and slightly more than a billion in 1985 and 1986 
[Niblett 2016]. Britain also spoke out against assisting less developed countries of 
the EEC with special financial obligations. All this illustrates that Thatcher’s 
government in the EEC defended its own interests inhibiting the adoption of 
measures running contrary to them, hindering the advancement of further 
economic integration. 
As a result of this policy, Britain managed to save billions of pounds, which 
had a positive impact on the development of the British economy, and especially 
the service sector. Encouraged by the stabilization of financial and economic 
situation, Britain spoke out for the establishment of a single European Market. 
“How we meet the challenge of the Single Market will be a major factor, possibly 
the major factor, in our competitive position in European and world markets into 
the twenty-first century… Companies need to identify the new opportunities and go 
out and seize them” [Thatcher 1988 : 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107219 ]. This passage is indicative 
and prominent. On the one hand, Mrs. Thatcher uses the word combination 
“competitive position” to underline the fact that Britain is in a state of competition 
with Europe, to stress that they are rivals to some extent. On the other hand, in the 
second part of the passage we come across a kind of instruction for the companies 
which are similar to those at war or hunting: identify…, go out and seize. The usage 
of words stresses the idea of being at difficult terms with Europe.  
It was a monetary and financial integration on British terms that would 
reinforce significantly the country’s position in the Western Europe. However, 
 being opposed by France and Germany, soon it became clear that all British 
attempts had failed. Even in these circumstances, London continued to negotiate 
with its European partners. 
The Conservative government was convinced that such financial and 
monetary integration would strengthen big British multinationals and the country 
would take a leading position in the Community. However, Thatcher’s government 
at that time didn’t realize the amount of centralizing power it would give to 
Brussels. Nevertheless, the British provision was fixed in the Single European Act 
(SEA) that became the first major revision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Quite 
expectedly, the British Conservative Cabinet soon stated that the UK was not going 
to limit its sovereignty even after the creation of the single market. 
This position was clearly expressed by M. Thatcher in her speech in the 
College of Europe in Bruges (1988). In the 1980s Margaret Thatcher was against 
the idea of joining the European Monetary System (EMS) and common social 
policy, because, she saw it as steps towards the formation of a political union.  
This hostile policy towards Europe went on until 1990, when Margaret 
Thatcher, due to her personal unpopularity, strident social policy and obvious 
inner-Party quarrels, was forced to leave the posts of the Prime Minister and 
Conservative Party’s leader and hand it to her successor – John Major. 
For seven years the conservatives under J. Major tried to “rehabilitate” and 
turn the situation with the European policy toward deepening cooperation, but they 
did not succeed. What Thatcher’s government did was set the direction of travel 
for Tories against the EU that more or less had been maintained till the referendum 
on Brexit. The fact that the main hostility to the EU today comes from the right 
wing proves our statement.  
Perhaps the only, but very important, achievement of the less radical 
conservative policy in the sphere of integration during this period was the signing 
and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 – 1993. J. Major called 
negotiations on the creation of the EU one of his main political achievements. 
Once “he returned home saying he had won “game, set and match for Britain” by 
 securing an opt-out” [The Economist 2011 : 
http://www.economist.com/node/21541875]. In John Major’s we find sport 
language terms. From stylistic point of view they are neutral. But the usage of 
them in the political report dealing with the relations with Europe shows that new 
British political leader appraises the situation as an ordinary and very simple one, 
as one he has to deal with doing sports. Besides, this phraseological unit stresses 
British victory over the opponents, and shows Britain has already gained the results 
in the political struggle. 
However, there were opponents of the official course inside the country. 
Procedure of the Maastricht Treaty ratification exacerbated the situation within 
The Conservative party up to the limit. The Euroscepticism got an excellent chance 
to create new anti-European movements, gaining new members primarily from The 
Conservative Party. Disagreements over the Maastricht Treaty were shared not 
only by Tories, but also by the opposition Labor Party which unexpectedly turned 
away from its anti-European course. The most heated discussion among politicians 
was caused by the provisions of the Social Chapter, in other words the social 
protection program of the EU countries. Eurosceptics in the ranks of both Tories 
and Labours, claimed that the Social Chapter, in particular its provisions on 
minimum wages and maximum working week, could be potentially dangerous for 
the competitiveness of British industry. Split in the government was so serious that 
the country's leadership had to concentrate entirely on these disagreements. 
Margaret Thatcher, who united opponents around J. Major became the leader of 
Eurosceptics. In general, the opposition supported the creation of a Free Trade 
Zone in Europe, but they strongly spoke out against political integration and the 
introduction of common social policy. They also believed that the Maastricht 
Treaty would lead to the formation of a “federal Europe” in which the policy 
would entirely come from Brussels. This would mean a further irretrievable loss of 
sovereignty and empowerment of the European Court.  
In spite of the opposition, J. Major managed to secure a special status for the 
UK in Maastricht. “As a result, on May 21, 1992 the Maastricht Treaty was 
 approved by the House of Commons with 336 votes against 92” [Forster 2002 : 
32]. “Britain was, once again, taking part in the integration process … and 
keeping aloof from it” [Revauger 2010 : http://jprevauger.over-blog.com/article-
refusing-the-logic-of-maastricht-welcoming-enlargement-63905192.html]. The 
author uses two word combinations together to confront them and to emphasize the 
position of Britain in the process of integration with Europe. The second 
expression is stylistically coloured. It has the meaning: “being remote or distant 
from someone or something”. Britain tried to deal with Europe but on its own 
terms. The language of the article proves that. 
However, the situation changed after the referendum on the Maastricht 
Treaty in Denmark (June 2, 1992). The Danish “no” was a shock to all EU 
countries. The revealed unpredictability of voting by referendum meant for Major 
that the ratification of the treaty could only be realized through the parliament. 
Thus, in attempt to convince members of parliament, the government of John 
Major had to gain some time. This delay at the same time strengthened the 
opposition and gave greater confidence to the Eurosceptics, who wanted to fail the 
ratification. Their position was also reinforced by Britain's withdrawal from the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), known as the “black Wednesday” on 
September 16, 1992. Eurosceptics called for the renunciation of the obligations 
under the Maastricht Treaty. However, Major believed that it would weaken the 
position of Great Britain in the EU. The Prime Minister was even ready to enlist 
the support of Labour and liberal democrats. The struggle between Eurosceptics 
and pro-Europeans reached its peak precisely on the issue of social policy, when in 
July 1993 the Labor tried to include the Social Chapter in the text of the treaty, 
while voting against its ratification. As a result, some “Conservative Eurosceptics 
voted with the Labor Party against their own government” [Forster 2002 : 32]. In 
this situation, Major took a bold decision, linking the issue of ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty with a vote of confidence to his government. As a result, 
Eurosceptics had no choice but to support the government. Thus, after a year of 
discussions, the Maastricht Treaty was finally ratified by the British Parliament. 
 Despite the fact that the Tories supported the government of Major, no one would 
deny the crisis inside the party. Its essence is extremely simple: while in power, 
Major was no longer in control of the situation. The price of Treaty ratification 
proved to be extremely high for the British political elite. First of all, it marked the 
final split in the Conservative Party on the European question. In addition, the 
adoption of the Treaty intensified the confrontation not only within the country, but 
between London and Brussels. The index of The Conservative Party’s popularity 
under J. Major gradually began to fall in within the British society. As a result, by 
the next elections in 1997 the conservatives came “broken” and totally exhausted, 
which led to a crushing defeat in the parliamentary elections and the Labour party 
was back in power.  
“The problem is that Major lost so badly in 1997 because the Tories had 
totally run out of steam by then (if not by 1992), there was virtually no talent left in 
the government and change was seen as necessary by people who would never 
ordinarily consider themselves to be Labour voters.” [Cohen 2017 : 
https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/02/left-tories-best-friends/]. The author of the 
article uses several linguistic features to place emphasis to the fact that the time of 
Conservative party’s power on the political arena is out. First of all, a stylistically 
coloured expression: to run out of steam. This is a set expression, an idiom. It has 
the meaning: to suddenly lose the energy or interest to continue doing what you are 
doing. From political point of view The Conservative party had exhausted itself by 
the 1997. Then the author uses an exaggeration word “virtually” to emphasize that 
there were no talented people at all. There was no leader left. That was a 
catastrophe for the party.     
Summing up the results of this period, it is important to pay attention to the 
following issues. The eighteen years policy of conservatives in the field of 
rationalizing the dialogue on issues of institutional development with Europe can 
be defined as consistent. M. Thatcher has done everything possible to ensure that 
in the field of bilateral relations British interests were always on the first place. In 
fact, it was Thatcher who presented “a model of British pragmatism” to the 
 dialogue about the need for integration with Europe. However, in the longer term, 
such large-scale socioeconomic reforms were marked for the UK by rising 
unemployment and exacerbating internal contradictions that forced many people to 
vote for Brexit. 
  At the same time, J. Major tried to act differently, making a choice in favor 
of rapprochement by restoring the dialogue on structural and institutional level. It 
should be noted that this approach was dictated not only by Major's personal 
ambitions, but also realities of the time, primarily by the growing economic and 
political potential of Germany and France, in the debate on the future of the EU. 
There were two leaders with two versions of the same policy. The point is 
that both Thatcher and Major had the same strategic goal when planning and 
determining foreign policy priorities, namely to put not some abstract ambitious 
plans, but real national interests on the first place. However, Thatcher and her 
successor, due to various factors, looked at Europe from opposite points of view. 
That’s why we don’t think that for eighteen years the Conservatives managed to 
work out a single, holistic approach to the problems of European integration. In the 
period from 1946 to 1997 the European policy of Britain has come a long and 
difficult way. During this time, the views of the British political elite and society 
regarding the rapprochement with Europe have repeatedly and significantly varied, 
but at the same time never changed radically. At the end of The Conservative 
government term in service, the idea that the future of the country began in Britain 
finally got stronger among the British society. 
 
2.2. New Labour and missed opportunity for Europe: linguistic 
characteristics of the situation   
 
In the early 1990s, the EEC transformed into ambitious and influential union 
with strong political and economic potential. However, all the problems associated 
with the integration and transformation of the EU remained relevant. Today, 
especially after the Brexit referendum in Britain, the EU is at a critical stage of its 
 development, going through a very complex process of structural and institutional 
transformation and actively trying to adapt to new realities and challenges of our 
time. The similar process of integration is also experienced in all EU member 
states, especially when new political forces with an alternative vision and 
understanding of current internal and external problems come to power. And in this 
historic-political context, from our point of view, the experience and outcome of 
modernization of the classical British strategy towards Europe under the New 
Labour, deserves careful attention. 
With the victory of Tony Blair and New Labour in the 1997 elections both in 
Britain and in the EU, certain political hopes and expectations were associated with 
the revision of the conservative Eurosceptic approach to European integration and 
progress in bilateral relations. With the arrival of a properly pro-European T. Blair, 
Britain had a chance if not to squeeze the Eurosceptic genie back in the bottle, at 
least change the situation for the better relations with Europe. So, did they? As we 
keep looking for the reasons of why Brexit happened, a closer examination of the 
new policy should be required. 
At first, the ambitions of Tony Blair and the first New Labour government 
(1997-2001) were really full of strength and determination to overcome the anti-
European legacy of the past and to heal Britain from morally obsolete 
Euroscepticism. However, the strategy for which the main stake was made, in 
practice only distracted them from their first goals and led the party away from 
Europe which significantly complicated  the situation in the European direction of 
Britain's new foreign policy. 
In general, the main idea of the European strategy for a whole decade under 
the New Labour and Tony Blair was extremely simple. If we admit that real, 
complicated European policy contains a powerful potential that can adversely 
affect the personal popularity of the prime minister and the stability of the party, 
then, in practice, it simply needs to be replaced by new political simulacrum that is 
suitable in meaning at least on the surface. This means that, in words, T. Blair 
always listened to the initiatives and recommendations of the official Brussels with 
 particular interest, but in fact he was never in a rush to implement them and didn’t 
miss any opportunity to explain the Europeans a personal and pan-British vision of 
a particular problem. As it used to happen before, under Blair, “Britain’s domestic 
politics always trumped European policy” [MacShane 2016 : 89].  
But, even nowadays former British Prime Minister struggles against Brexit 
and for Brussels’s initiatives. “Tony Blair: Britain must give up MORE powers to 
Brussels and mass migration 'GOOD for UK…Tony Blair has called allied for 
Britain to surrender MORE powers to unelected Brussels bureaucrats and insisted 
mass migration from eastern Europe has been GOOD for the country as he made a 
bizarre case for staying in the EU” [Gutteridge 2016 : 
http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/644765/Tony-Blair-EU-referendum-
Britain-surrender-powers-Brussels-mass-migration-good-UK ]. In the article the 
author uses several linguistic features to stress Tony Blair’s points of view. The 
author uses orthographical features to emphasize the necessary information: 
MORE, GOOD. Then, the author uses the repetition of these two words to 
underline his points even more. Later the author discusses Mr. Blair’s political 
behavior and makes use of a stylistically coloured adjective “bizarre” in the word 
combination “a bizarre case” for the readers to pay attention to the rather 
inadequate political behavior of former Prime Minister.  
As a result, the real EU problems soon gave way to ordinary self-promotion, 
where T. Blair undoubtedly achieved a big success. The new British leader has 
brilliantly managed not only to attract the attention of influential colleagues in the 
EU, but also to acquire the pro-European political image. He talked about the key 
problems of integration and European ideas, expressed new ambitious and resonant 
projects which had a big spectator success. But the problem is that he didn’t do it 
in Britain. Blair rarely spoke about Europe at home, but abroad he was willing to 
stress his support for integration. 
The first government pro-European political steps aimed at returning to 
Europe such as: the signing of the Amsterdam and Nice treaties, St. Malo 
Declaration and the Kosovo crisis, disputes about the future of the single European 
 currency and, finally, equal participation in the ideological project of institutional 
reform in the interests of expanding the EU to the East, to some extent influenced 
the course and results of central discussion on the strategic objectives and priorities 
of European construction. 
In Britain, Blair was trying to look at the economy, which had gone through 
reforms of the Conservative era. As a result, Britain had the lowest inflation rate in 
thirty years. Economic growth was strong, there was progress in health and 
education, unemployment was significantly reduced. More and more people were 
getting higher education; the quality of medical services for the population 
significantly improved. Despite this, the government spending on public service, 
health care, pensions and education reduced. Britain gradually began to get out of 
the socioeconomic crisis. As head of government, T. Blair did a lot for Britain in 
terms of economic improvement and cultural openness. 
However, what did the new government want on Europe? The main issue 
remained the same, namely whether the interests of Britain and the EU coincided 
at this stage or not? And here again there was an eternal, incurable conflict of 
interests. “In effect, Labour came to power with no clear ambition for where the 
party wanted Britain to go on the question of Europe” [MacShane 2016 : 89]. 
If we consider the most significant European initiatives of the “New” Britain 
during this period, it should be noted that all of them were to some extent not 
caused by the desire to respond and approve the variant of integration proposed in 
Brussels, but rather a single-minded will to stand out at any cost from the "general 
crowd”.  
In fact, in Britain then and now, people have a fear of losing their national 
identity. This fear of a super state is a sort of ideological engine that limits the 
country's positions in European structures and discussions about the development 
of European integration processes. The image and real politics as practice shows 
are not always the same elements. T. Blair had brilliantly managed to create a pro-
European image and revive the dialogue with Europe that was at a low point, but 
he failed to fill it with a new, truly constructive content. “Tony Blair's mystique 
 was quite dissipated and his promise shattered; upon the stage of national and 
international politics, discernible through its clouds and mists, there now stood not 
a great man but a "great tragic figure"” [Wheatcroft, The Atlantic 2004, June 
issue]. Everybody knows that when Tony Blair came to power he was compared 
with John F. Kennedy. Everybody spoke about his mystique and charisma. So, the 
author of the article uses the allusion as a linguistic feature. The allusion leads to 
those times, when Mr. Blair was much spoken about. But, unfortunately the 
promising beginning of the political career hasn’t led to the glorious end. Then, 
there is a metaphor in the passage: the politics is described as if it were a stormy 
weather with “clouds and mists”. The metaphorical usage emphasizes not a simple 
and not an easy way the politics is done.  And finally, the author uses the 
oppositeness to oppose two states of Tony Blair: “not a great man but a "great 
tragic figure””. The oppositeness helps the readers to understand the complete 
political failure of a man who was supposed to be a great politician but failed in his 
career. 
If the first government of the New Labour, at least, tried to pretend that 
Britain really intends to get closer to Europe, the second (2001 – 2005) 
demonstrated that the transatlantic relationship was paramount in the country’s 
external relations. We are talking about the further development of “special 
relations” with the US in the fight against international terrorism after the events of 
September 11, 2001.  
“Intra-European differences came to the fore in late 2002 and early 2003 as 
the United States prepared its case for an attack on Iraq” [Smith 2005 : 715].  
Blair was willing to give British support to military action and sent a large number 
of British troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. The second term of Labour in 
government, therefore, finally put everything in its place. “The UK not only turned 
away and withdrew from Europe, but also demonstrated to the whole world the 
harsh, aggressive, truly imperial nature of the “new” national foreign policy” 
[Tyrie 2014 : 14].  
 The situation worsened with the next enlargement of the EU in 2004 which 
was actively promoted by T. Blair. This decision generated a wave of discontent in 
Britain because of the cheap labour from Eastern countries. The majority of 
member states restricted access to their labour markets for new economic migrants. 
Only three countries, including Britain, decided not to take advantage of this 
opportunity. The Labour government wanted to use cheap labour for economic 
purposes. In 2005, despite the abuse from the opposition, T. Blair went further and 
decided to support an increase in the EU budget makes investments in the new 
member-states. By and large, now Britain was open to workers from Western 
Europe. Among some groups of people the influx of foreigners to the UK raised 
many fears. British workers saw immigration in purely economic terms; they 
couldn’t compete with such a low wages. In this connection, support for the new 
populist parties of the right – UKIP and the British National Party (BNP) has 
significantly increased. It was already clear that the party began to appease 
“forgotten” groups of people, especially the white working-class voters hostile to 
immigration. 
For T. Blair, it became extremely difficult to persuade people and British 
business that further integration with the EU is a great idea and they should like it. 
By and large, Blair’s attempt to entering the euro was hindered by the party’s 
concerns about public opinion and the Eurosceptic press. 
The thing is that in the 60’s and early 70’s Europe seemed like a future. For 
the ordinary Britons it meant escaping double-digit inflation, the three-day week, 
prices and incomes policies. The country looked across the Channel and believed, 
the Germans or French are doing something right, however, the situation has 
significantly changed. “While deficiencies remained, from the viewpoint of the 
later 1990s, Britain’s relative economic position was undoubtedly stronger than it 
had been two decades earlier” [Pope 1998 : 70]. Unlike the post-war period, when 
the business leaders saw Europe as a source of growth and entrepreneurial 
innovation, now in comparison to the rest of western countries, Britain performed 
strongly in growth of GDP per head and labour productivity in manufacturing. 
 Moreover, the fact that the EU never managed to make trade agreements with the 
countries like China, India, Russia or the US only straightened the position that 
Britain could cope just fine on its own. As a result the leaders of British business, 
who are usually strong supporters of the right wing, which always remained 
extremely anti-European, turned their head to the US and Asia. In such conditions, 
it was both politically and economically inappropriate to talk about bright 
prospects for European integration.  
However, in our opinion, the third incomplete legislative period (2005-2007) 
was the most symbolic and indicative in British dialogue with Europe. It was a 
natural result of Blair's very ambitious modernizing policy as the leader of the New 
Labor Party. This period continued the general line of alienation from Europe. As a 
result of obvious inattention and disregard for the European direction, T. Blair 
practically ceased to be perceived as a political leader, he became the European 
symbol of the entire negative that was associated in the rest of the world with 
extremely unfavorable political image of the US.  
The public discontent and even rejection of the national domestic and 
foreign policy pursued in the UK was so strong and obvious that T. Blair was 
forced to resign. 
“Blair’s successor as prime minister, Gordon Brown, did even less to put 
the case for a positive engagement in Europe” [MacShane 2016 : 104]. The 
Labour party under G. Brown didn’t return to the Euroscepticism of the 1980’s but 
definitely never managed to produce a clear and comprehensive vision of how they 
see the country’s future in the EU. The author compares two Prime Ministers and 
pays our attention to the fact that Gordon Brown “did even less” than Mr. Blair. He 
uses the word “even” to emphasize the insignificant result of G. Brown’s political 
activity.  
In our opinion, the biggest problem of the twelve-year reform policy of the 
New Labour was the conflict between the domestic and international policy. The 
very first government domestic achievements were discredited by the outcome of 
foreign policy. What is even more important is that Labour under Tony Blair and 
 Gordon Brown lost all the enthusiasm for Europe, in other words their pro-
European policy never managed to convince people. To put it simple, if your own 
government is not enthusiastic for the EU, why would all the people think that the 
European integration is the best choice? 
Meanwhile, throughout the Blair and Brown years in service most of the 
press and a hard core of Conservative party, instigated by Ukip (which already 
became the third political power in Britain) and BNP continued to insist on 
separation. And what’s important is that these voices were much more clear and 
confident in their beliefs. “Brussels was bureaucratic, arrogant, wasteful, 
undemocratic, unreformable” [Henley 2017]. In this situation, the economic crisis 
of 2008 that turned into the wider economic recession further alienated British 
public opinion from the EU. The outcome was quite predictable, in 2010 Labour 
lost power. 
 
2.3. The major forces that took Britain out of the EU: 
linguistic aspect of the process 
 
The result of the parliamentary elections in May 2010, when the 
Conservative party came back to power can partly testify that British people shared 
their support with David Cameron's views on the formation of a restrained policy 
with the EU which was presented in the party manifesto. 
The new British prime minister was concerned about the crisis of the 
eurozone, weakening of European competitiveness in the world and the absence of 
democratic control over the EU institutions. In this case, D. Cameron called the 
structural reform of the EU, which should be built on "the principles of 
competitiveness, flexibility, returning of powers to the national states, democratic 
accountability and justice” [The Guardian 2013 : 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-eu-speech-
referendum]. Reading the analytical report in the famous newspaper “The 
Guardian” we understand that British Mass Media evaluates the new Prime 
 Ministers activity rather high. Too many adjectives in the quotation prove it. All 
the adjectives are strong both in meaning and from grammar point of view. 
D. Cameron's policy on Europe reached its peak when he decided to 
organize the referendum on Britain's membership in the EU. It's easy to imagine 
that such a decision entails huge political risks, both for stability within the 
Conservative Party, and for relations with European countries and the US. The 
question is why did Cameron make such a decision? The answer lies not only in 
relations with European partners. First of all, we need to analyze Cameron's views 
on Europe throughout his political life.  
In the course of his political career, D. Cameron repeatedly called himself an 
Eurosceptic, although, clarifying that he is “a practical, sensible reasonable one at 
the same time” [Kirkup 2010]. That is why his position on Europe was not 
consistent and went through a kind of evolution in which we can distinguish three 
stages. 
The first stage – euroscepticism falls on the parliamentary period of his 
political career. To some extent, it is a “tradition” which, like most Tories, he 
automatically accepted. However, the further hostility of the Conservative position 
towards Europe was closely related with the crisis within the party.  
The period from 1997 to 2005 was the time when Tories were extremely 
divided on the question of Europe. This political instability within the party 
resulted in the loss of many white-working class voters who found the new 
alternative in face of the UKIP party.  
In 2005 D. Cameron and a former Europe minister, David Davis fought for 
leadership of the Conservative party. Both candidates were Eurosceptics, but 
Cameron went further than his rival and promised the British withdrawal from the 
European People’s Party (EPP). “That promise of withdrawal from political 
Europe was enough to win him the election for party leader” [MacShane 2016 : 
114].  
However, having won the post of a party leader, Cameron launched a 
process of party rebranding with the main goal, namely to return middle-class 
 voters. At this stage, his position can be described as “moderate Euroscepticism”. 
The party has moved from the right to the center, having made its position on the 
most important issues of domestic and foreign policy more balanced. During this 
period of time, David Cameron's Conservative party refuses the most radical 
demands on the EU, in particular, holding a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. “On 
Europe Cameron stated for the refusal of joining euro and the EU “referendum 
lock”, which was part of the Conservatives' campaign promise to repatriate 
powers to the UK” [Euractiv 2011]. In this comment we come across some 
interesting usage of the language. The usage of the noun “refusal” shows that the 
author has no doubt about the political platform of David Cameron. He stresses 
that the Prime Minister’s point in this matter is strict. Another expression 
“referendum lock” is also rather interesting from the linguistic point of view. It 
means that the survey in the country will be a kind of lock on the door to Europe. 
And, besides, at the end of the sentence there is one more expression – “to 
repatriate powers”. From our point of view, this stylistically coloured expression 
means that under the new Prime Minister the power will come back to the UK. “To 
repatriate” means: “to send or bring someone, or sometimes money or other 
property, back to the country that he, she, or it came from”. So, the main promise 
of the new Prime Minister was to bring all the powers back to Britain, not to give 
them to Europe. 
In 2010, having failed to win an absolute victory in the elections, the 
Conservatives found themselves in a situation of political bargaining with the 
Liberal Democrats (LDP). During negotiations with the most pro-European 
political force in Britain, a compromise was found: the Liberal Democrats agreed 
to stop further integration with Europe, and Tories refused their attempts to 
repatriate powers lost by Westminster. 
Despite the fact that European issue was one of the most difficult to 
negotiate, both parties demonstrated the ability to remain united in the 
development of political course. 
 However, from the end of 2011, we can see that D. Cameron almost returned 
to the original “Tory Euroscepticism” in its aggressive form, which was reflected 
in the development of several anti-European initiatives.  
“For instance, in 2011 the British Prime Minister vetoed the deal because he 
said he was concerned about forfeiting national budget sovereignty” [DW 
Academie 2012]. In 2012 Cameron refused to participate in the Banking Union of 
member countries and the audit of Britain's membership in the EU. The peak of the 
anti-European policy was his promise to hold the referendum on Britain's 
membership in the EU.  
In fact, even after his political promise on referendum Cameron continued 
the anti-European line. Among his further offers were: the limiting immigration 
within the EU from less developed eastern countries; the intention to withdraw the 
country from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and 
even the early exit of the UK, if Jean-Claude Juncker would be nominated as the 
next president of the European Commission. Thus, the intensity of Cameron’s anti-
European rhetoric only gained momentum. In addition to that, the Eurosceptic 
press and Conservative backbenchers strongly supported this, quite hostile line on 
Europe. “The British people took note. They had a prime minister and a 
government and a press that did not like Europe.” [MacShane 2016 : 121]. From 
the linguistic point of view this quotation is interesting, because it gives comment 
on the situation, using structural repetition as a linguistic mean for the reader to 
understand that everything (government and press) and everybody (subjects and 
the Prime Minister) are not ready to unite with Europe, because they don’t like it. 
This repetitive construction emphasizes the idea of total dislike.    
Summing it up, we note that first of all, David Cameron is a pragmatist and 
only then – Eurosceptic. Undoubtedly, the critical attitude towards European 
integration was a characteristic of the prime minister at all stages of his political 
career. However, it is difficult not to notice that Euroscepticism for Cameron is not 
an ideology that determines his political decision-making, but an instrument that he 
skillfully used depending on the political situation.  
 Starting his career in politics, Cameron correctly understood anti-European 
sentiment, which began to develop actively as a form of inner-party opposition 
under J. Major. The further crisis within the party shifted the balance of power in 
favor of Eurosceptics. Meanwhile, since the election as a party leader and then 
Prime Minister, in attempt to modernize the party image and strengthen the 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats, Cameron took a very moderate position on 
the European question. But then, in 2011 D. Cameron returned to the anti-
European policy, which largely related to the changes of political situation. 
Pragmatism is based on the fact that he chose the role of moderator: Cameron had 
always been trying to juggle with the conflict situations inside the party and the 
coalition cabinet. That’s why we think that his decision to hold the referendum 
aimed at resolving a number of internal political tasks.  
First of all, his promise of the referendum was a way to reduce the general 
discontent within the Conservative party and neutralize the further demands of the 
backbenchers.  
The second reason was a threat to his leadership from the mayor of London, 
Boris Johnson who considered that “Britain leaving EU would not be cataclysmic” 
[The Guardian 10.05.2013]. In other words, the anti-European emphasis in 
Johnson's rhetoric forced Cameron fight for popularity among party members and 
the conservatives' electorate.  
The referendum on EU membership was proposed by Cameron with the 
intention not only to solve problems within the party, but also to win the 2015 
general election. Hence the third factor – the growing popularity of the far right 
UKIP party. D. Cameron was under pressure during his first mandate because 
Tories were divided, this was a reflection of the trend that more and more people 
rejected the EU project and voted for UKIP. “It resulted in the 2014 elections to 
the European Parliament where Nigel Farage's party scored a stunning victory with 
27 percent of the vote” [The Daily Star 2014 : http://www.dailystar.co.uk/paper-
archive]. 
 It should be noted that the UKIP success reflected the Eurosceptic attitude of 
the British society towards Europe. Namely, the British distrust of the EU political 
institutions, in particular, the European bureaucracy. It's become widely believed 
that the EU is a “producer of all kinds of restrictions” [ The Economist 2013 : 
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21589229-britains-leaders-do-not-
want-it-leave-eu-it-could-happen-anyway-channel-deep]. The situation was 
aggravated by the eurozone crisis and the recession of the British economy, as well 
as the influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe. Therefore, unlike big enterprises, 
dependent on its European partners, a significant part of British society has already 
been imbued with anti-European sentiments.  The request from the society forced 
D. Cameron to respond in a timely manner. In this regard, it is necessary to 
mention not only relations with Europe, but also the problem of immigration. In 
order to neutralize the opponent (UKIP) and return The Conservative party's 
electorate Cameron, being a skillful political equilibrist had to drift to the right and 
finally give Britain its referendum. 
However, on June 26 Cameron's biggest gamble had ended in failure. As we 
all know, his arguments about the economic and security benefits Britain enjoys as 
a member of the EU failed to convince 52% of the voters. The country has finally 
pulled out of the EU. 
In our opinion, David Cameron made a wrong strategic choice in his 
campaign to win the plebiscite, namely “he put himself in the front line and turned 
the entire referendum into a personal vote of confidence in himself” [MacShane 
2016 : 240]. There is an opposition in this comment. The author opposes the 
national referendum with the personal vote of confidence. David Cameron is 
shown as a political hero who put himself in the front line. Two expressions – “the 
entire referendum – a personal vote of confidence” – form an opposition, they are 
used as antonyms. The author uses this construction with the purpose to show that 
the whole nation voted for the Prime Minister’s political idea.    
 But why would people trust to someone who was always being firmly 
against further European integration and now is trying to convince everyone that 
Britain should not leave the EU?  
Meanwhile, Nigel Farage and Boris Jonson just toured the country making 
the same well-known speeches about immigration, the UK’s budget contribution 
and sovereignty. The main problem with the sovereignty argument is that it is 
somewhat abstract argument unless you have an example how the loss of 
sovereignty is damaging to you and in this case the fact that you are under the rules 
of the EU, you are not able to control the entry of European citizens into your 
country at all. Being part of the EU, Britain has free movement of labour. So, 
immigration has been very high both from the EU and from other parts of the 
world, and as the result the majority of British people are worried about it. In other 
words, immigration was a very strong illustration of the loss of sovereignty and 
what it can mean in practical terms for real people. This dimension of the European 
project, raised by M. Thatcher became a really successful argument that the Leave 
camp used against the Remain camp. Yet, immigration resulted from a choice, both 
The Conservatives and Labour. To put it simple, Britain, under all its prime 
ministers since 1990, had focused on creating as many low-paid jobs as possible. 
In these conditions, many people wanted higher wages through less competition 
for jobs. The leave vote was a good chance to express the protest that had been 
accumulated for years against the existing unfairness. In a situation when people 
feel left-behind the normal reaction is to blame someone else. The brightest 
demagogues of the Leave campaign like Nigel Farage, Boris Jonson and Iain 
Duncan Smith knew exactly what all these people needed. They spoke to all those 
who were not satisfied with their wages, unemployment or affordable housing, the 
sense that more and more pubs were boarded, shops shuttered, hand car washes 
proliferated, that their children had non-English speaking classmates in the 
kindergarten.  
Leave camp arguments were populist but striking. If you would like less 
bureaucracy imposed on small businesses, just vote for Brexit! If you are tired of 
 being dictated to by unelected foreign institutions, let us send a message! If you 
afraid that Europe is moving in an increasingly free-market direction, say no! If 
you think EU is a failed project, speak loud!  
Even if we take into account the fact that much of what they have said has 
nothing to do with the EU or is completely wrong (like the vote-to-leave-bus 
emblazoned with the slogan if Britain left the EU there would be 350 million a 
week to spend on the National Health Service), it is clear that the Leave camp did a 
better job. They simply had better talkers with clear vision of what they wanted – 
to leave the EU.  
On the contrary, all the Remain camp arguments about all the benefits 
Britain enjoys as a member of the EU failed to convince the majority of voters. 
Instead of making positive arguments of being with Europe, the Remain side was 
trying to send a message that Brexit entails deadly economic risk. However, it was 
being drowned out by many Britons who, according to the executive director of 
Britain in Europe, Will Straw “were very angry with what they felt had been done 
to them in their communities over decades – the decline of industry, the rapid 
increase in people coming to the country, the levels of austerity” [ Behr 2016 : 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/05/how-remain-failed-inside-story-
doomed-campaign#comments].  
The author describes the situation in the country and shows the emotions 
using specific linguistic measures. First of all, at the very beginning of the 
quotation, the word “angry” was used, to show British people emotions directly, 
without any coverage. Then, the author enumerates the negative features in the 
country, which took place during the last decades. He uses simple word 
combinations, but the structure of the sentence is of importance, because the reader 
really feels the increasing emotions and feelings.   
To put it simple, all these “left-behind” people were not afraid of change and 
wanted to shake the status quo.  
Of course there were some undecided people, those who would never love 
the EU, but could be persuaded “to stick with it for safety’s sake” [MacShane 2016 
 : 179]. In our opinion, Cameron had a chance to win their votes, but in comparison 
to the well-organized rightwing group he sounded too evasive and tetchy. The 
plain truth is that the Remain camp had a difficult goal to achieve; Cameron for 
instance, was torn between campaigning for remain and fear of provoking a split 
within the Tories. While the prime minister was losing his biggest gamble, the anti-
EU British press and media were about to win their biggest victory. N. Fafage 
whose appeal was principally on the single issue of quitting Europe became a BBC 
star with his weekly appearances in the most popular political discussion shows, 
like “BBC Question Time” to denounce and demonize everything about the EU. 
“The biggest-circulation serious papers and tabloids – the Daily Mail, the Sun, the 
Daily Telegraph, the Daily Express, The Times and the Daily Star, whose 
combined readership is over 15 million – have been engaged in a 20-year 
propaganda campaign against Europe” [Whitely 2016 : 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-why-did-old-people-vote-
leave-young-voters-remain-eu-referendum-a7103996.html]. By and large the 
British press created conditions in which 52% of people could vote for Brexit. It 
did so in a number of reasons. The pulling suggests that almost a half of “leave” 
voters did so because of the concept of sovereignty, but only few people can 
explain how the EU works. We think that the main problem with the British media 
and newspapers is that for decades it has done two paradoxical things: it has 
blamed the EU for increasing number of society’s ills while at the same time 
explaining to nobody how it operates. This unilateral approach contributed to the 
fact that many Britons couldn’t say anything positive about the EU, being sure that 
it’s a failed project. This lack of a positive culture for Europe contributed to the 
growth of Brexit tendencies. 
We can attribute Brexit to different political reasons in the UK, but the truth 
is that the leave campaign motivated a lot of people who don't normally vote on 
vague promises of more money, less foreigners coming to Britain, and stopping 
“eurocrats” tell Britons what to do, even though they don't. It was both a 
despicable and brilliant campaign. In this case, “there was surely little chance of 
 reversing a generation of cultural suspicion of the EU in a four-month campaign, 
fronted by a prime minister who had indulged his party’s most Eurosceptic 
tendencies throughout his career” [Behr 2016 : 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/05/how-remain-failed-inside-story-
doomed-campaign#comments]. 
People in the UK had many personal reasons to vote for Brexit, but we think 
that the most decisive elements were resentment of the ruling elites, anger for 
being forgotten in many parts of the country and anxiety about mass influx of 
foreigners. These are the real forces that prevailed over the economic and security 
benefits. Leave voters did so on what they believed and what they had been told 
over many years, not just the four months of the campaign. The Brexit referendum 
shows that there’s a huge gap between the government and the governed outside 
London who feel left behind due to the state policy of the last forty years and 
ignored by the elites finally took their revenge in the ballot box speaking loudly: 
“We want to leave the European Union”. The vote was clear enough. So Britain is 
out. 
And the forecasts are rather strong in favour of Brexit. “A vision of Britain 
outside the EU - confident, successful and free…Released from our Eurochains, 
pessimism withers and the economy grows as we become great again… Britain has 
become Hong Kong to Europe’s China” [Hannan 2015 : 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/11644904/A-vision-of-Britain-outside-
the-EU-confident-successful-and-free.html]. We can really feel the optimism of the 
article. The author uses three adjectives in the title of the article to describe all 
aspects of the British people’s feelings: confident, successful and free. Then we 
come across author’s neologism:  Eurochains. The author has created a new 
political term to stress the fact that Britain has gained much more without 
European Union. This is an allusion to the term “Eurounion”.  And finally, there is 
a rather interesting and important simile: Britain has become Hong Kong to 
Europe’s China. The simile has been based on the comparison of the highly 
developed city of Hong Kong with Britain, and done not in favour of Europe.  
 CHAPTER III.  What’s next? 
 
3.1.The Brexit process: 
how the UK will withdraw from the European Union 
 
The referendum on Britain's membership in the EU marks the beginning of a 
new Europe. For the first time in history of European integration one of the 
member states decided to withdraw from the Union. 
Brexit was a shock not only for the EU, but also for the UK. The victory of 
Leave campaigners came as a big surprise because even the ardent supporters of 
independence did not expect that they would prevail in number. As we mentioned 
in the previous chapter there was little involvement and engagement in what the 
EU is, what it does to the extent that when the Leave camp won, the leader of the 
Labour party, Jeremy Korbyn got up on television and said that the government 
should immediately trigger Article 50, which set out the exit process [Steward 
2017 : https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/19/corbyn-to-impose-three-
line-whip-on-labour-mps-to-trigger-article-50], and nobody really had any idea 
what that meant or what to do with it. We can assume that many members of 
“Brexit Club” didn’t really seriously think that Brexit would happen. To put it 
simple, Britain has signed a blank contract and now is discussing the terms. And 
the fact that it didn’t happen the other way round is because both Eurosceptics and 
Euroethusiasts failed to explain what it would really be for the UK to leave the EU.  
Some people believe that Brexit can be considered as a “call for awakening” 
for the EU ruling elites, whose ideals of integration find less support among the 
member-states. Others like a co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy 
Research Dean Baker see some positive aspects in the current situation saying that 
Brexit will help the EU to “return back on a path of high employment and healthy 
growth” [Baker 2016 : http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/brexit-
change-europe-britain-us-politics-213990]. 
 As for the UK, there is no doubt that the consequences will be quite 
significant. We have already witnessed the first wave of consequences from Brexit. 
Right after the referendum stock exchanges showed a sharp drop in many indices, 
in particular, the Japanese NIKKEI fell by 1.286 points (afterwards trades were 
closed in order to avoid further drop), British stock market index FTSE 100 fell by 
7.4%, German stock exchanges – by almost 10%, and the French CAC 40 index – 
by 9.63%. The value of the pound has fallen to a minimum since 1985. At some 
point, pound was at 1.3305 against dollar which means that the British pound fell 
by 10% [Choudhury 2016 : http://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/23/asia-stocks-to-focus-
on-uk-brexit-referendum-results-weaker-yen-gains-in-us-stocks.html]. As it 
usually happens, the fall of the pound triggered the fall of other market 
instruments, currencies, raw materials, indices, and shares. Companies from the 
FTSE 100 share index lost about £100bn in price, and the index fell by 8%. 
Nevertheless, the stock prices of the five largest British banks fell by an average of 
21%, the morning after the referendum. However, banks like HSBC and Standard 
Chartered have fully recovered, while Lloyds, RBS Group and Barclays continued 
to fall more than 10% [Allen 2016 : 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/23/british-pound-given-boost-by-
projected-remain-win-in-eu-referendum]. In political terms, there have also been 
some changes. David Cameron paid the price for his failure to secure Britain's 
future in the EU announcing his resignation. Theresa May became the new 
country’s leader. Having formed a new government, she began to work on a 
strategy for getting out of the EU. 
The first reviews and opinions about the Britain’s withdrawal from the EU 
were various and at times very contradictory. But now we can make more rational 
forecasts concerning the future relations between London and Brussels. To begin 
with, it is important to outline some UK’s options outside the EU.  
First, it was assumed that Britain could follow the Norwegian model. This 
would mean the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and joining the European 
Economic Area (EEA) with an access to a single European market (financial sector 
 of the economy is not included). However, if we take into consideration the fact 
that many leave campaigners were opting to leave the EU in order to regain 
sovereignty, then, this model is not the best way to do it. The thing is that EEA 
members must accept basic principles of the Union, including the free movement 
of workers. “That means the primary driver of the Brexit campaign – concerns 
about immigration – would remain unaddressed [Witte 2016 : 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/15/what-would-
britain-look-like-post-brexit-here-are-fourpossibilities/?utm_term=.c87bbd40d108 
].”  
Secondly, it was considered that Britain would follow the Swiss model. In 
this case, the country, being outside of the EU or the EEA would have to negotiate 
a series of agreements with Brussels for each sector of the economy. In addition to 
that, the Swiss model excludes trade in services – a huge part of the British 
economy [Dhingra 2016 : 5]. 
Thirdly, there is a possibility to enter into a customs union with the EU, 
which will further give its industry a free access to the European market. Thus, 
London will follow the Turkey’s model. But the deal excludes services and 
agriculture. Turkey can’t regulate tariffs it has to impose on goods it imports from 
non-EU countries, because it has to apply the European common external tariff to 
those goods.” In other words, with this model Britain would lose trade sovereignty 
[Barker 2016 : from: https://www.ft.com/content/7e0bce28-dbda-11e5-a72f-
1e7744c66818]. 
The most radical option is if the UK completely breaks off its ties with the 
EU and will act only in accordance with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.  
As we can see, all of the alternatives to EU membership have their own drawbacks 
and would certainly impose costs on British economy. Then, there's no surprise 
that the biggest debate within the government or the public is on whether Britain 
should go for hard or soft Brexit.  
 In immigration terms hard Brexit essentially means ending free movement as 
one of the EU red lines. In this case, Britain will be unable to remain in the 
Common Market without permission of a free movement.  
Soft Brexit is more likely to remain within the European Economic Area 
(EEA) in much the way as Norway does. But, as we have mentioned previously, in 
this case Britain will have to continue with free movement. 
On February 2, 2017, the British government published the new plan for the 
country's withdrawal from the EU. One week before, T. May made it clear that 
following the example of Switzerland or Norway, Britain will leave the EU's single 
market. To put it simple, the British prime minister decided to go hard Brexit. 
According to her, anything else would mean accepting the European rules, such as 
“free movement of goods, services, capital and, most controversially, labour” 
[Chapman 2017 : http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/brexit-latest-
news-what-is-eu-single-market-customs-why-care-if-uk-leaves-it-european-union-
theresa-a7531061.html]. It is also planned to withdraw from the customs union, 
because it would hamper the ratification of new trade agreements between the UK 
and other countries. There will be changes in terms of immigration and social 
policy. T. May calls the new program as “the greatest expansion in workers’ rights 
by any Conservative Government in history”. So, the government decided to 
expand the rights of workers, for instance by increasing the number of annual paid 
holidays from 4 weeks (According to EU legislation) to 5 – 6 weeks. The reform 
will also include a bevy of protections for the first time for self-employed people 
[Newton 2017 : https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3561226/employees-will-get-time-
off-for-a-lost-child-and-sick-family-in-radical-expansion-of-workers-rights-
theresa-may-to-declare/].  
It's been assumed that the Brexit vote was in large a vote against the free 
movement. The decision to leave Europe was because of having enough of 
supposedly uncontrolled migration. In this connection, the British government 
stated that there will be measures of immigration control from EU countries. At the 
same time, T. May assured that the rights of European citizens living in Britain, 
 and the rights of Britons living in Europe, will be preserved. As for migrants from 
outside of the EU, Britain will develop an independent policy. 
As we can see, Britain has several options to leave the EU and the 
government is able to design its future policy according to the country’s 
mainstream vision. However, the legislative procedure of withdrawal is the same 
and compulsory for all the member-states and, like the EU regulations is quite 
complex. According to M. Emerson, one of the leading British and European 
economists, it “would be more like a long and expensive divorce” [Emeroson 2015 
: 155]. 
On March 29, nine months after the referendum Britain “has officially 
launched the Brexit process, triggering Article 50 and starting a two-year 
negotiations before the country drops out of the European Union” [Watts 2017 : 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/article-50-trigger-latest-theresa-
may-brexit-begins-leave-eu-talks-negotiations-a7655636.html]. It is expected that 
on March 29, 2019 the UK will finally leave the Union. However the period of two 
years negotiations can be continued, but this will happen only with the approval of 
all 27 EU member states [Hughes 2017 : 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/31/brexit-donald-tusk-article-50-eu-
watch-live/]. 
If somehow the UK will have another referendum with the goal to return 
back (more than 4 million British people signed the petition for the second 
referendum) then it should apply like any other country [Millward 2016 : 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/28/petition-for-second-eu-referendum-
hits-4-million-as-hundreds-att/].  
To sum it up, we can say that the UK is not going to copy any existing 
model of relations with the EU (for example, Norwegian or Swiss). Britain will 
design its unique model based on the country’s national interests and challenges, 
which appeared post Brexit. The process of withdrawal will be difficult and brutal, 
but as T. May declared “there can be no turning back”. The country will leave the 
EU. The most important question is what would happen with the UK next. 
  
3.2. What would happen with the UK next? 
 
In a historic nationwide referendum, nearly 52% of British voters chose to 
leave the EU. The UK is now entering uncharted territories. Evidently, this will 
trigger a chain of events for Europe as well as the UK and far beyond. In this 
subchapter we will explain the possible economic and political outcome of Brexit.  
Yet, the most important issues between the UK and the EU are mutual trade and 
financial relations. The EU is the largest market for British exports, and the UK in 
turn is the largest market for the export of goods from Europe. In 2015, the UK 
exported about £230 billion worth of goods and services to the rest of the EU, 
according to UK data, while importing around £290 billion. Ireland is the most 
important trading partner, with the largest number of exports of goods and services 
from Britain (about £10 billion). The UK in turn is the main importer of goods and 
services for Germany, France and Spain (for example, German is exporting to 
Britain around £25 billion, Spain and France about £10 billion) [Sippitt 2017 : 
https://fullfact.org/europe/uk-eu-trade/]. As we mentioned in a previous 
subchapter, the Brexit referendum is now followed by negotiations between 
London and Brussels. A new framework for relations between Britain and the EU 
will have to be worked out. Matters such as free movements of people, goods and 
services will have to be settled. According to some experts, negotiating such terms 
might take a decade [Withnall 2016 : 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-deal-trade-10-years-still-
fail-uk-ambassador-brussels-theresa-may-a7476306.html].  Others, like Rodrik 
Abbott, former EU ambassador to WTO, believe that Britain may have a trade 
agreement with Brussels in a couple of years [Rankin 2016 : 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/aug/08/uk-could-clinch-trade-deal-
with-eu-within-two-years-says-expert]. Furthermore any agreements between the 
UK and the EU will have to be ratified by the EU member states. It means that 
there is a strong chance it could fail. That’s why we think that the British 
 government face an uphill struggle – it is necessary not only to negotiate terms and 
sign relevant documents but also to do it as fast as possible in order to prevent the 
formation of trade and economic uncertainty, which is disastrous both for the UK 
and for the EU itself.  
Among the priority foreign trade partners, the British government mentioned 
the US, China, Hong Kong, Canada, Australia, India and Japan. However, many 
economists think that signing trade agreements with these countries will require 
much more time. Even if we assume that the removal of tariff barriers on finished 
goods can be made quite quickly, then removing barriers from mutual trade in 
service industry, (about 80% of British economy) [Cadman 2016 : 
https://www.ft.com/content/2ce78f36-ed2e-11e5-888e-2eadd5fbc4a4], will take 
much more time and efforts. However, the UK is still part of a united Europe, 
therefore it can’t sign any agreements with third countries on its behalf. 
In addition, there are some reputational risks and levers of influence that 
Britain will lose. According to Sir Chris pin Tickell, the British ambassador to the 
UN: “all these years later, coming out will be a great disaster because we will lose 
the ability to shape the future of Europe. We should have played a major role in the 
EU’s evolution. Now we will have no role in Europe, and much-reduced power 
and influence in the world generally” [Tickel 2016 : 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/25/how-britain-negotiated-its-
entry-to-the-eec-then-failed-to-play-its-part]. 
However, despite this position, many politicians think that trade relationship 
with Britain is the EU’s Achilles heel. In this connection there is an opinion that 
very first attempts of European authorities to introduce customs tariffs for the UK 
would be followed by statements of the EU national producers, in particular 
Germans, to maintain the status quo. For instance, Frank Dollendorf, director of 
economic affairs for the Bavarian Chamber for Industry and Commerce has 
described Brexit as “a slap in the face” and stated that “we would do everything to 
raise our voice”, especially after his industry had to look on as politicians imposed 
trade sanctions on Russia.” For some German regions, such as Bavaria, Britain is 
 the second largest trade partner after the US. In 2015, the total volume of exports 
from Bavaria to the UK amounted to €15.5bn, which is 22% more than in 2014 
[Oltermann 2016 : https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/21/brexit-
untangling-uk-industry-europe-german-manufacturing-single-market-bavaria].   
At the same time, it’s quite obvious that many European manufacturers, 
including German ones, faced with a choice would prefer a single market over the 
UK. Many believe that the British withdrawal from the EU will lead to significant 
negative consequences for the economy of the state. 
David Davis expressed the opinion that the country could import more 
electronics from Asian countries, thereby being the beneficiary from the absence of 
customs restrictions in mutual trade in this direction. However, as Tobias Nickel, 
Head of Corporative Communications, noted that “Britain can’t produce a Rolls-
Royce on its own. It would really surprise me if the UK would sacrifice its last 
remaining industry on the altar of Brexit” [Oltermann 2016 : 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/21/brexit-untangling-uk-industry-
europe-german-manufacturing-single-market-bavaria]. 
On the other hand, as we mentioned above, quite undoubtedly, the service 
sector, will be more susceptible to a recession than the production industry, 
because the country has post-industrial economy. It will not be difficult for 
Brussels to introduce stringent restrictions on the export of services from the UK.   
The financial services have the largest share in the UK foreign economic relations 
and it should be noted that London is the main international financial center. In 
other words it is the place of accumulation of banks, funds and corporations that 
carry out currency, insurance, credit and financial operations. About 30% of all 
world currency, credit and financial transactions are made in London. Around 75% 
of the EU foreign exchange and interest rates derivatives trading takes place in the 
UK [Davies 2017 : https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/apr/26/london-
financial-centre-brexit-eu-paris-frankfurt-uk] some investment banks immediately 
after the referendum announced that they are planning to transfer their operations 
to other European cities (Dublin, Paris, Frankfurt, and Amsterdam) [Campbell 
 2017 : https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/jan/23/post-brexit-london-
economic-self-sabotage]. HSBC announced that the bank will transfer part of its 
operations to Paris, explaining that this decision may be postponed until the official 
withdrawal of the UK from the EU [Morris 2017 : 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/brexit-latest-news-hsbc-bank-
move-20-per-cent-fifth-london-banking-operations-paris-chief-executive-
a7532711.html]. A similar situation can be observed not only in relations with the 
EU, but also with other foreign trade partners. The US bank Morgan Stanley 
(MS.N) announced that its headquarters will need to be moved from Britain after 
Brexit [Zainab 2017 :   http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-banks-factbox-
idUKKBN16Y1YS]. By and large, it is quite expected that the volume of 
cooperation with the EU in terms of finance will definitely decrease.  
In terms of British-American relations, despite the fact that T. May and 
Barack Obama promised to maintain strong political and economic ties between 
Britain and the US despite the Brexit vote, the majority of American experts think 
that post Brexit cooperation will not be very prosperous. Because the US, in the 
light of the UK weakening as an important trading partner, will focus on other 
states and develop projects of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) [Millward 2016 : http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/04/theresa-
may-britains-relationship-with-the-us-will-be-strong-des/].  
How will these consequences affect the UK and the EU? It is obvious that 
the European bloc expects a long period of disintegration, instability and 
rebranding. “On march 25, 2017, European leaders marked the sixtieth anniversary 
of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the EU’s founding document, in what was a 
fraught celebration due to the Brexit elephant in the room” [Wilkinson 2017 : 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/what-is-article-50-the-only-explanation-you-
need-to-read/]. Meanwhile, the UK, in order to save its current economic positions, 
will need to make significant efforts to strengthen links in other directions (G20, 
Commonwealth, UN) to ensure the supply of those goods and services that 
previously were channeled through the EU and vice versa.  
 Another issue, which is probably the most important for many British 
people, is the integrity of the UK. As we know out of all people who voted more 
than 16,141,241 people (48%) voted to remain in the EU, while 17,410,742 (52) 
voted to leave [Lewis 2016 : http://time.com/4381042/leave-eu-referendum-brexit-
vote/]. If we look at this data on a more regional level, it is clear that the integrity 
of the UK is at serious risk. For instance, England without London voted to leave 
the EU with a roughly 55% majority. Wales also voted to leave with an arrow 53% 
majority [Fisher 2016 : https://electionsetc.com]. The rest of the UK voted to 
remain and this is where the haziness and uncertainty come into this whole 
situation. Starting with London, the only one region in England to vote in favor of 
remaining we see that nearly 60% of the voters wanted to be with the EU. This has 
led some to call for the secession of the City from the UK and creation of an 
independent city-state that would later rejoin the EU. As we explained above, 
London is the world's top financial center and it has a lot to lose. That’s why a 
petition to further this goal has more than 180 956 supporters [O’Malley 2016 : 
https://www.change.org/p/sadiq-khan-declare-london-independent-from-the-uk-
and-apply-to-join-the-eu]. However, the odds of this ever happening are likely very 
small. 
The possibility of another secessionist movement is much bigger. For 
example in Scotland an obvious majority of 62% voted to remain in the EU while 
38% voted to leave [Curtice 2016 : 
http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2016/10/why-did-scotland-vote-to-remain/]. 
The thing is that in 2014, Scotland held a referendum to decide if the country 
would become independent or not. That time, 55% of Scots voted to remain a part 
of the UK and among the largest reasons why they did so was the fear that 
Scotland would have found itself outside of the EU and would be forced to apply 
for its membership. This concern is now irrelevant since Brexit happened, so on 
March 13, 2017 the First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon announced second Scottish 
referendum [Stone 2017 : http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/second-
scottish-independence-live-referendum-nicola-sturgeon-brexit-speech-second-
 indy-ref-2-uk-eu-a7626746.html]. We think that there’s a big possibility this time 
that Scotland would leave the UK and seek to regain the EU membership which 
would cause a lot of problems for Britain.  
As for the Northern Ireland, the situation looks like around 56% of people 
there voted to remain in the EU [Ferguson 2016 : 
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/brexit-northern-ireland-votes-
to-remain-in-the-eu-1.2697132], but since the UK voted to leave, they will be 
leaving as well. The main problem here is that the Republic of Ireland is the EU 
member state and the two countries have a Common Travel Area (CTA) between 
them. It means that the border between the two parts of Ireland is open with 
minimal restrictions [Walsh 2017 : 
http://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/letters/brexit-and-the-common-travel-area-
1.2964150]. Hypothetically, it is possible that the Northern Ireland will hold a 
referendum to leave the UK altogether like Scotland and reunite with the rest of 
Ireland. It is also unclear whether or not this would ever happen, but Brexit has 
definitely raised the issue. 
Summing up, we can assume that Brexit, despite its abruptness, quite 
obviously would have a significant impact on the UK. In the coming years, the 
geopolitical situation will be very difficult for Britain because its relations with the 
main partners, the US/EU will change. At the same time, it will be necessary to 
negotiate trade agreements with a number of countries, since after leaving the EU, 
Britain also withdraws from all its trade agreements. The two-year period of 
negotiations may be extended for a longer period, since some issues will be 
followed by a series of meetings in order to agree on all aspects of the country's 
exit from the European bloc. In this case, certain issues would be very difficult to 
negotiate. In particular, we are talking about customs tariffs financial flows 
barriers, further forms of cooperation in Research and Development (R & D), 
innovation, high technology and education. We have already witnessed the first 
wave of Brexit consequences: from the pound collapse to the shock of the 
European and world financial markets. London now is facing the threat of 
 weakening its position as the financial capital of Europe. At the same time, there is 
a possibility that the second largest British trading partner, the US can shift the 
focus to such promising projects as the TTIP or the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP). It is obvious that Britain now will slightly loose its influence in the world. 
As for the UK integrity, nobody really knows what is going to happen next. 
It could be the end of the country as it exists now where Scotland will be breaking 
away and moving back with the EU or Northern Ireland leaving and being reunited 
with the rest of Ireland or none of these things will happen and the UK will stay 
together united and separated from Europe.  
Overall, what Brexit will look like remains to be seen, but what is already 
clear is that it will definitely change the course of British history. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
On June 26, 2016 the UK voted in its special referendum and the majority of 
voters decided to exit the EU. Prior to this vote everyone speculated that staying in 
the EU would win by a small margin, but all of the speculations were proven false. 
About 33 million people voted and the leave campaign won by more than one 
million votes. In this research we have explained how the UK has come to this 
point and why it has happened.  
Basing on the study conducted the following conclusions can be drawn: 
1. There is no doubt that the relationship between the UK and Europe has 
been a difficult one. A complex series of reasons made British membership in the 
Union problematic. As a former Empire, Britain did not want to focus its political 
interest only on Europe. The entrance of the UK in the EEC was more of a forced 
nature. The fact that Britain joined the Six only for economic reasons during 
difficult times resulted in popular discontent. Some voters felt they had been 
misled when the EEC (EU) turned into a political process for a united Europe. In 
this research paper we have found out that such a widespread disillusionment with 
the European project was also equally shared by the political elite. Ever since there 
was a change in opinion and both Tories and Labour were divided because of the 
European issue. These are the reasons why from the very beginning of its 
membership in the EEC Britain did not put forward its own initiatives and created 
obstacles to the deepening of the integration processes. 
 The linguistic aspect of studying the phenomenon of Brexit has been 
completed on the basis of the analysis of the political leaders’ speeches and the 
Mass Media comments. The research has found out that there are  some common 
and unique features both in the speeches of the main Prime Ministers understudy 
and in the Comments of British Mass Media.      
2. The period of Margaret Thatcher was marked by the increasing political 
isolation of Britain from Europe. The Conservative government criticized many 
aspects of European integration and was extremely unhappy with its main 
 direction. In the early 1980s, it was already clear that the Community was 
transforming into the integration association of today with attributes of a super-
state. In Britain this process received a hostile welcome, as integration was 
perceived as an obstacle and contradiction to the country's national interests.  
Under J. Major the UK policy on Europe did not change a lot. The British 
prime minister tried to provide a more pro-European policy, the epitome of which 
was the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. However, the government at that time 
was extremely divided on the European question and by the end of J. Major's 
premiership returned to their former eurosceptic positions as it was under M. 
Thatcher. 
The speeches of  M. Thatcher are unique from the linguistic point of view. 
Her manner of speaking is rather optimistic. The language of the speeches is 
characterized as direct and emotional. There are many antonyms used in antitheses 
to show the two sides of the situation. The constant usage of Present Perfect tense 
is a unique grammar feature. Mass Media characterized M. Thatcher as “an iron 
lady”, this metaphor became her nickname in press all over the world.   
3. Tony Blair's attempts to sell Europe to the British did not end up 
successfully. We think that the main problem is that many people inside the 
country felt upset by the Blair government’s rather cavalier approach to opening 
the UK up to migrants from the Eastern countries before most other EU member-
states states allowed it, so immigration resulted from a choice. In other words, the 
British government accepted that the UK requires a liberal immigration in order to 
be economically prosperous. As a result many Britons felt left-behind because they 
could not compete with low skilled workers from different EU countries. 
Subsequently when the rest of the Union allowed free movement from these 
countries, Britain was unable to enforce its own borders. This is how immigration 
became a very strong illustration of the loss of sovereignty and what it can mean in 
practical terms for real people.  
Tony Blair speeches are highly emotional. There are too many stylistically 
coloured words and word combinations. Besides, there is a specific linguistic 
 feature in the language of Mass Media comments: journalists use orthographic 
mean – they capitalized words, write a lot of words in capital letters to emphasize 
the overemotional Prime Minister. Tony Blair’s beginning is widely compared 
with J.F. Kennedy in the Mass Media texts, but at the end of his career he was 
known as “tragic figure”. Mass Media comments were full of metaphors and 
similies.     
4. David Cameron’s role in Brexit is significant. As we explained, nothing 
he has done in his political life before the referendum announcement contradicts 
the view that the UK has a leader who is against further integration with Europe. 
The British prime minister felt pressure from the radical right wing of his own 
party. Cameron caved because he thought he could win not only the 2015 general 
election but Brexit referendum as well. However, his pleas for Britain to vote to 
remain in the EU ended in failure. Clearly, no one single event led to Brexit but a 
complex series of items. First of all, there was only a slight possibility of changing 
a generation of Britons who were extremely suspicious about the EU in less than 
one-year remain campaign led by a prime minister who totally changed his mind 
on Europe in order to win his gamble. Secondly and probably most importantly, 
the Leave campaign did a better job in explaining people what they have to do. 
What was clear is that the leading voices of the Leave camp, for instance Boris 
Johnson and Nigel Farage just kept repeating the same anti-European statements 
and it allowed them to have an answer to anybody’s concern of anything. Whether 
you don’t like the government or the EU bureaucracy – vote leave and take back 
control! As we can see, it worked successfully. Meanwhile, the Remain camp 
didn’t have any argument that could really compete with that.  
As we can see from this work, people in the UK had many motives to vote 
for Brexit, but the most decisive factors were resentment of the ruling elites which 
had been growing for decades among certain groups of people in different parts of 
the UK and an intention to stop a tide of mass migration. Those forces 
overwhelmed David Cameron’s arguments about the economic and security 
benefits Britain enjoyed as a member of the EU. 
  David Cameron’s speeches are full of strong adjectives to show his political 
position as a leader. There are many exclamatory marks in them. As for the 
language of Mass Media, it should be stressed that the comments were always 
strict and full of respect, using the stylistically coloured language.   
5. In the coming years, the geopolitical situation will be very difficult for 
Britain because its relations with the main partners, the US/EU will change. At the 
same time, it will be necessary to negotiate trade agreements with a number of 
countries, since after leaving the EU, Britain also withdraws from all its trade 
agreements. The two-year period of negotiations may be extended for a longer 
period, since some issues will be followed by a series of meetings in order to agree 
on all aspects of the country's exit from the European bloc. In this case, certain 
issues would be very difficult to negotiate. In particular, we are talking about 
customs tariffs financial flows barriers, further forms of cooperation in Research 
and Development (R & D), innovation, high technology and education. We have 
already witnessed the first wave of Brexit consequences: from the pound collapse 
to the shock of the European and world financial markets. London now is facing 
the threat of weakening its position as the financial capital of Europe. At the same 
time, there is a possibility that the second largest British trading partner, the US 
can shift the focus to such promising projects as the TTIP or the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP). It is obvious that Britain now will slightly loose its influence in 
the world. As for the UK integrity, nobody really knows what is going to happen 
next. It could be the end of the country as it exists now where Scotland will be 
breaking away and moving back with the EU or Northern Ireland leaving and 
being reunited with the rest of Ireland or none of these things will happen and the 
UK will stay together united and separated from Europe. All we know is that this 
will take years to figure things out and that history never really does feel like 
history while we are living through it.  
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